


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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: Podgorny will visit Hanoi
next week.

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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNY
WILL LEAD A DELEGATION TO HANOI NEXT WEEK.

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[REDACTED] THE SOVIET LEADER-
SHIP HAS A BUSY SCHEDULE THIS MONTH, AND THERE MAY
BE SOME SLIPPAGE IN THE TIMETABLE. NONETHELESS, A
HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM IS ALMOST
CERTAINLY IN THE CARDS.

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THE SOVIET DECISION TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT NIXON
AFTER THE MINING OF NORTH VIETNAM'S PORTS DID NOT
GO DOWN WELL IN HANOI, AND MOSCOW UNDOUBTEDLY SEES
A NEED TO REASSURE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. HANOI
WILL WANT TO DISCUSS WAYS OF GETTING SUPPLIES THROUGH,
AS WELL AS THE USSR'S LUKEWARM ENDORSEMENT OF ITS
CURRENT OFFENSIVE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PROBABLY
RESENT MOSCOW'S VEILED SKEPTICISM ABOUT HANOI'S PROS-
PECTS IN THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE AND ITS REPEATED RE-
PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE BEST
WAY TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE VISIT IS LIKELY
TO BE DIFFICULT. THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT
TO REASSURE THE VIETNAMESE, BUT IN WAYS THAT WILL
NOT UNDULY DISTURB THE US OR THE ATMOSPHERE GENERATED
BY RECENT US-SOVIET TALKS. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY
TO CITE THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE CHINESE COOPERATION
REGARDING SEA SHIPMENTS TO HANOI AS EVIDENCE THAT
THE USSR HAS NOT ABANDONED THE VIETNAMESE, AND THEY
WILL PROBABLY BE AMENABLE TO ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE
SUGGESTIONS ON NEW APPROACHES TO THE CHINESE TO SE-
CURE THEIR COOPERATION IN GETTING SOVIET SUPPLIES
TO NORTH VIETNAM. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE
SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO REITERATE THEIR VIEW THAT
NEGOTIATIONS OFFER THE VIETNAMESE AS MANY ADVANTAGES
AS FIGHTING, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL URGE THE VIET-
NAMESE TO EXPLORE THE LATEST US PEACE PROPOSALS.

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
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